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Reputation Concerns and
Slow-Moving Capital
Abstract
We show that fund managers’ reputation concerns induce a preference over the skewness
of strategy returns. This preference is non-monotonic in the manager’s reputation level:
While managers with average reputations prefer negatively skewed strategies, those with
very high or very low reputations prefer the opposite. Our model also explains why
only negatively skewed strategies tend to suﬀer from slow-moving capital: A subtle
but natural consequence of adopting negatively skewed strategies is that after poor
performance, managers’ reputations recover slowly. In the meantime, they are unable
to raise capital, leaving attractive opportunities unexploited.

JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: G11, G23.
Keywords: Reputation, Slow-moving capital, Career concern.
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Introduction

Many popular hedge fund strategies have been compared to “picking up nickels in front
of a steamroller” because they tend to earn small proﬁts most of the time but occasionally lead to dramatic losses. One example is the currency carry trade, where speculators
borrow currencies with low interest rates to purchase currencies with high interest rates.
This strategy usually produces positive returns, but the risk is that the high-rate currency may devalue, leading to heavy losses. That is, the strategy return is negatively
skewed.1
This pattern of negative skewness in hedge fund returns is a pervasive phenomenon.
Out of the ten investment-style based Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund indices, we
document that four are signiﬁcantly negatively skewed, while only one is signiﬁcantly
positively skewed. Moreover, the negatively skewed indices represent more than 40% of
the collective assets of Index member funds, while the positively skewed index is positively minuscule, representing less than 1% of member funds’ assets. Why are strategies
with negative skewness so popular? What kind of managers ﬁnd them appealing? What
are the consequences of their popularity? We analyze these questions in a stylized model
of fund managers’ strategy choices.
The key ingredient of the model is reputation concerns. Investors do not have access to certain investment opportunities and delegate their capital to managers, who
make investment strategy choices. Managers are rewarded based on their performance.
Moreover, from the performance, investors update managers’ reputation according to
their Bayesian inference about the managers’ ability. Reputation concerns arise due
to competition among managers: A manager will lose his job if his investors can ﬁnd
other managers with better reputations. Hence, a manager faces the tradeoﬀ between
his current period management fee, which is linked to the performance of his current
investment, and the chance of keeping his job so he can earn management fees in the
1

Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2008) document that the return distributions for carry trade
strategies are negatively skewed.
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future. The implications from this simple model are the following.
First, the model shows that reputation concerns induce a preference over the skewness of strategy returns. That is, all else being equal, the skewness of the strategy return
can inﬂuence managers’ choices. This eﬀect depends on the manager’s reputation level,
in a non-monotonic way. Managers with average reputations prefer, on the margin,
strategies with negatively skewed return distributions, i.e., “nickel-picking” strategies.
Indeed, they may prefer to forgo more proﬁtable opportunities to adopt these strategies. Intuitively, a manager with an average reputation understands that he is highly
replaceable. Knowing that he will lose his job after a poor performance, this manager
ﬁnds negatively skewed strategies appealing because they have a low chance of incurring
losses.
Managers with a relatively high reputation, however, ﬁnd nickel-picking strategies
less appealing. This is because they are well established, and will be able to keep their
jobs unless they incur a big reputation loss. Although losses are rare in nickel-picking
strategies, they tend to be large when they do occur. Hence, holding everything else
constant, well-established managers have the incentive to avoid nickel-picking strategies. On the other hand, if a manager’s reputation is way below average, he also ﬁnds
nickel-picking strategies unappealing. This is because he will lose his job unless he can
signiﬁcantly improve his reputation. A small proﬁt from the nickel-picking strategy is
not enough to help the manager keep his job. In this case, the manager prefers to “swing
for the fences”—hoping for a big success to signiﬁcantly boost his reputation, even if the
chance of this success is small. That is, this manager prefers strategies with a positive
skewness.
Therefore, while average managers prefer strategies with negatively skewed returns,
managers with very high or very low reputations prefer the opposite. To the extent
that most managers have average reputations (and very few surviving managers have
below-average reputations), our model oﬀers a simple explanation for the popularity of
nickel-picking strategies among hedge funds.
2

Second, our model explains why only negatively skewed strategies tend to suﬀer from
so-called “slow-moving capital.” A natural consequence of negatively skewed strategies
is that managers’ reputation tends to go up gradually in small steps, but once in a while
drops sharply in a big step. Intuitively, by the law of iterated expectations, a manager’s
reputation is a martingale. If a martingale process goes up more often than down,
the average size of the up-moves has to be smaller than the size of the down-moves.
Therefore, after one down-move, it tends to take several up-moves to recover back to
the original level. That is, after a shock, rebuilding reputation is a slow process.
This result sheds light on the slow-moving capital phenomenon documented in Mitchell,
Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007). They ﬁnd that before the end of 2004, convertible bond
arbitrage funds, whose returns tend to be strongly negatively skewed, were very popular
and collectively managed around $40 billion of assets. After some large losses, however,
this strategy quickly went out of fashion in 2005, and the total assets under management
in this sector fell by half within several months. Interestingly, the authors also note that
the typical convertible bond arbitrage strategy appeared to be more proﬁtable in 2005,
and this seemingly proﬁtable opportunity appeared to last well into 2006 (the end of
their sample). This extensive delay for capital to move back is puzzling, and the authors
dub it “slow-moving capital.”
We argue that this is a natural phenomenon in the context of our model of reputation
concerns. Put simply, after a big negative shock hits many managers in a certain trading
strategy, it damages their reputations, leading to large capital withdrawal. Now, even if
this trading strategy becomes more proﬁtable than it was before the shock, it still has a
hard time attracting capital. The reason is that the managers who have the expertise to
implement this strategy have damaged reputations and have a hard time raising more
capital to invest in this strategy. This delay can be substantial since, as our earlier
intuition suggests, rebuilding reputation is a slow process. In the meantime, capital
appears to be slow moving, leaving attractive opportunities unexploited. Our model not
only oﬀers a simple explanation of slow-moving capital, but also naturally links it to its
3

precursor: large losses and drastic capital withdrawal. It is also interesting to note that,
for all the cases documented in Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007), the involved
strategy returns tend to be negatively skewed.
Our paper belongs to the growing literature that focuses on the eﬀect of managers’
career concerns (e.g., Allen and Gorton (1993), Dow and Gorton (1997), Stein (2005),
Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2007), Vayanos and Woolley (2008), Moreira (2012)), and
is most closely related to Dasgupta and Prat (2006, 2008) and Guerrieri and Kondor
(2012). Dasgupta and Prat (2006) provides a micro foundation for fund managers’
career concern, with a focus on the excess trading induced by reputation concerns.
Dasgupta and Prat (2008) and Guerrieri and Kondor (2012) analyze the roles of career
concerns in information aggregation and asset price volatility. Similar to these studies,
we also show that this concern induces a preference over skewness. In contrast to those
studies, we show that this reputation-concern-induced preference over skewness is nonmonotonic in the manager’s reputation level. In addition, we also analyze the eﬀect of
reputation concerns on capital mobility. This adds to the growing literature that tries to
understand slow-moving capital. For example, Duﬃe (2010) explores the consequences
of the fact that some investors are absent from the market. He and Xiong (2009)
argue that the optimal contract choice can restrict the movement of capital. Acharya,
Shin, and Yorulmazer (2009) show that the tradeoﬀ between making investments today
and waiting for arbitrage opportunities in the future can lead to a shortage of capital
when occasional ﬁre sales occur. Oehmke (2009) argues that one cannot raise capital
quickly if he has to sell assets in another illiquid market. The mechanism in our paper
is likely to be more suitable for cases in which capital appears to be extremely slow
moving. More broadly, our paper is related to the literature on limits to arbitrage
(Dow and Gorton (1994), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) and delegated asset management
on portfolio choices (e.g., Carpenter (2000), Ross (2004), Basak, Shapiro, and Tepla
(2006), Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007), Basak and Makarov (2008), Lan, Wang,
and Yang (2013)) and on equilibrium prices (e.g., Cuoco and Kaniel (2001), Vayanos
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(2004), He and Krishnamurthy (2007), Kaniel and Kondor (2013), Kondor (2009)).
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Contracting issues
are discussed in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes. All proofs are provided in the
Appendix.

2

Model

The model has two periods, t = 0, 1, 2. There are a large number, n, of risk neutral
investors. We treat it as if there is a continuum of them, with a total measure of one.
Each investor is endowed with

$1
n

at t = 0 and another

$1
n

at t = 1. They have access to

a zero return riskless asset, rf = 0. Alternatively, an investor can delegate her wealth
to a fund manager. One investor can only hire one manager and one manager can only
work for one investor.
At t = 0 an investor chooses whether to delegate her endowment to a fund manager
to invest for one period. We use c1 to denote the investor’s gross return at t = 1. That
is, if the investor chooses to delegate her capital to a manager, c1 is the after-fee total
payoﬀ from the investment; or, if she invests in the riskless asset on her own, c1 = 1 + rf ,
where rf is the riskless interest rate. The investor then consumes c1 and decides again
whether to delegate her t = 1 endowment to a manager for another period or invest on
her own.2 We use c2 to denote the investor’s gross return at t = 2. An investor’s choice
can be summarized by Dt for t = 0, 1,
{
0 invest in the riskless asset,
Dt =
1 hire a fund manager,
and her objective is to choose Dt to maximize her expected consumption
max E[c1 + c2 ].

D0 ,D1

(1)

At time t = 0, on the labor market, potential fund managers (“managers” for short)
2

For simplicity, we let the investor consume c1 at t = 1. Alternatively, we can let the investor
delegate all her wealth at t = 1, c1 + 1. The results are qualitatively similar and the calculations
become more complex.
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arrive, in suﬃcient number to match with all investors. Managers are risk neutral. A
manager may be either a “good” type g or a “bad” type b and the type is observable only
to the manager himself. A manager can choose to invest in one of two trading strategies,
strategies 1 and 2. Strategy returns are exogenous: If a type-k manager (k = g, b) adopts
strategy i (i = 1, 2), his return has a binary distribution:
{ +
ri with a probability pki ,
ri =
ri− otherwise,

(2)

where ri+ > rf > ri− ; the strategies neither dominate nor are dominated by the risk-free
asset. We say that a manager fails in a strategy if he gets the low return from the
strategy, ri− , and that a manager succeeds in a strategy if he gets the high return, ri+ .
We operationalize managerial skill by letting type-g managers succeed more often in
their strategies than type-b managers; i.e., pgi > pbi . Let r̄ik , for i = 1, 2 and k = g, b,
refer to a type-k manager’s expected return in strategy i:
r̄ik ≡ pki ri+ + (1 − pki )ri− .
One of our main focuses is to analyze the eﬀect of reputation concerns on managers’
preference over the skewness of their strategy returns. When constructing intuition,
the reader can think of strategies 1 and 2 as having similar means and variances, and
diﬀerent skewness, though in our analysis we will explicitly calculate the diﬀerence in
mean returns that would make a manager indiﬀerent between the two strategies. Let
strategy 1 be the more negatively-skewed strategy,
pk1 > pk2 ,

(3)

for k = g, b. Note that there is a one-to-one link between the failure probability and
skewness. That is, (3) holds if and only if strategy 1 has a lower skewness.3 When the
Speciﬁcally, pg1 > pg2 if and only if Skewg [r1 ] < Skewg [r2 ]. From the deﬁnition of skewness, we can
1−2pg
obtain Skewg [ri ] = √ g i g . Hence, Skewg [ri ] is strictly decreasing in pgi . A preference for a higher
3

pi (1−pi )

pgi is the same as a preference for a lower Skewg [ri ].
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strategies have suﬃciently similar means and variances, (3) implies
r1+ < r2+ ,
r1− < r2− .
That is, strategy 1 is like a “nickel-picking” strategy. It generates small gains r1+ most
of the time, but with a small probability may suﬀer from a large crash r1− .4

2.1

Reputation concerns

A manager’s reputation is deﬁned as the likelihood that the manager is type g, given
all public information. When managers enter the labor market at t = 0, their types are
drawn independently from a distribution with probability ρ∗ of being type g. So, their
initial reputation is ρ∗ . After a manager’s performance is realized at t = 1, investors
follow Bayes’ rule to update the manager’s reputation:
ρ|ri =

Pr(ri |g) × ρ∗
.
Pr(ri |g) × ρ∗ + Pr(ri |b) × (1 − ρ∗ )

(4)

We assume that the investor is sophisticated and informed enough to ﬁgure out the
manager’s strategy ex post and calculate his posterior reputation accordingly. This
assumption reﬂects the sophistication of typical big hedge fund investors—endowments,
pension funds, or funds of funds. All managers’ track records are observable to all
investors.
At t = 1, a measure µ of new managers arrive at the labor market, drawn from the
same distribution as the t = 0 rookie managers. So, the pool of available managers
includes both those with track records from t = 0 and the new arrivals. For the time
being, we set µ to be larger than the expected number of managers who will fail their
strategy at t = 1.5
4

To see this, consider a transformation that preserves a strategy’s mean and variance, but makes
its skewness more negative. As ri− decreases, pi must increase to preserve the mean. To preserve both
mean and variance, ri+ must also decrease (though by less than ri− ) while pi increases even further.
5
For example, we can set µ > 1 − pg2 . In general, seasoned managers who perform poorly at t = 1
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The labor market for managers is organized as follows. At time t, for t ∈ {0, 1}, the
manager with the highest reputation ﬁrst randomly matches with an investor. If the
matched investor decides to hire the manager, the pair leave the labor market and the
next round of matching starts for the manager with the second highest reputation. If
the investor decides not to hire the manager, she invests her endowment in the riskless
asset, and the manager is then randomly matched with another investor. This process
is iterated until all investors have made their investment decisions, or all managers have
left the labor market. If multiple managers have the same reputation level, seasoned
managers (who arrived at t = 0) match ﬁrst. If multiple managers have the same
reputation level and starting time, they match in random order. For the case where
investors are indiﬀerent between investing on their own and hiring a manager, they hire
the manager.
We assume that if a manager is hired, he will be paid a ﬁxed share ϕ (0 < ϕ < 1)
of his fund at the end of the investment period. This assumption perfectly aligns the
interests of the investor and the manager, except for the reputation concern, and hence
isolates the eﬀect from reputation concerns. Investors will choose to hire rookie managers
in equilibrium as long as, for i = 1, 2,
[
]
(1 − ϕ) ρ∗ (1 + r̄ig ) + (1 − ρ∗ )(1 + r̄ib ) > 1 + rf ,

(5)

that is, as long as investors expect an average manager to outperform the risk-free asset
after fees. Moreover, investors will not hire a type-b manager if
(1 − ϕ)(1 + r̄ib ) < 1 + rf .

(6)

In the following analysis, we assume (5) and (6) hold.
If a type-k (k = g, b) manager is hired at t = 0, his objective is to choose his t = 0
face two types of threats: their former investors may prefer to hire a new manager (with reputation ρ∗ )
or they may prefer to invest in the risk-free asset. With too few new entrants, some seasoned managers
will have to compete with new entrants, while others will only have to compete with the risk-free asset.
We will consider the case where the new managers are not enough to replace all failed managers in
Section 2.6.
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strategy i and t = 1 strategy j to maximize his expected management fees
max Ek [ϕ(1 + ri ) + D1 ϕ(1 + rj )],

(7)

i,j∈{1,2}

where Ek [·] is the expectation taken under the probabilities faced by type-k managers.6
If a manager is hired at t = 1, his objective is to choose his strategy j to maximize his
expected management fee
max Ek [ϕ(1 + rj )].

(8)

j∈{1,2}

2.2

Equilibrium

Definition 1 The equilibrium is deﬁned as (Dt (ρ), Akt (ρ)) for k = g, b and t = 0, 1,
where Dt (ρ) is investors’ decision at time t if they are matched with managers with reputation ρ, and Akt (ρ) ∈ {1, 2} is the strategy choice by a type-k manager with reputation
ρ at time t, such that,
i) taking managers’ strategy choices Akt (ρ) and all other investors’ decision rules
Dt (ρ) as given, the decision rule Dt (ρ) solves each investor’s optimization problem (1);
ii) taking investors’ decision rules Dt (ρ) and all other managers’ choices Akt (ρ) as
given, the strategy choice Akt (ρ) solves each manager’s optimization problems (7) and
(8).
In the absence of career concerns, a manager always takes the strategy with a higher
expected return. If the highest expected return strategy is diﬀerent for good and bad
managers, managers’ types would be immediately revealed. In our analysis below, we
will focus on the more interesting case in which the manager’s reputation concern is
more important, so that a type-b manager prefers not to immediately reveal his type at
6

For simplicity, we assume that the manager still manages the same amount of capital at t = 1. An
alternative is to assume that a manager can manage a bigger fund when he has a higher reputation,
as in Dasgupta and Prat (2008). For example, if fund size is linear in reputation, then the manager
( g )2
p
pb
> p2b . Although this intuition is not captured in our Proposition 1, our
prefers strategy 2 when pg2
1
1
later analysis in Section 2.4 does capture this intuition for “swinging for the fences.”
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t = 0. The simplest way to achieve this is to assume, as we will, that
r̄2b = r̄1b .

(9)

i.e., a type-b manager ﬁnds the two strategies equally proﬁtable and hence his decision
is solely determined by the motivation to mimic type-g managers at t = 0. In other
words, although type-g managers have the incentive to signal their type, equation (9)
makes the signalling ineﬀective, since type-b managers can mimic type-g ones without
any cost. Therefore, under condition (9), the only pure strategy equilibrium at t = 0 is
pooling. This does not mean separation is not important. One can imagine that many
agents in the economy have even less skill than our bad managers, and ﬁnd it too costly
to mimic type-g managers. Such agents, however, will reveal themselves immediately,
and thus would choose not to become managers in the ﬁrst place.
Proposition 1 For the economy deﬁned above, one equilibrium is as follows:
i) Investors: Investors’ decision rules are, for t = 0, 1,
{
1 if ρ ≥ ρ∗ ,
Dt (ρ) =
0 if ρ < ρ∗ .
ii) Managers: Managers’ strategy choices are: at t = 0, for k ∈ {g, b},
{
1 if r̄1g + R > r̄2g ,
k
A0 (ρ) =
2 if r̄1g + R ≤ r̄2g ,
where R = (pg1 − pg2 )(1 + max{r̄1g , r̄2g }); and, at t = 1, for k ∈ {g, b},
{
1 if r̄1k > r̄2k ,
k
A1 (ρ) =
2 if r̄1k ≤ r̄2k .

(10)

(11)

(12)

This proposition highlights the eﬀect of reputation concerns on managers’ preference for
skewness. Due to assumption (5), investors prefer to hire a fund manager rather than
invest on their own at t = 0. Since all managers have the same reputation ρ∗ , they
can all attract investment. If a manager generates a low return at t = 1, however, his
reputation will fall. As a result, he will not be able to attract investment in the second
10

period since there are plenty of new managers with reputation ρ∗ . Taking into account
this concern of losing their investors, managers may distort their investment strategies
at t = 0.
Suppose the two strategies have the same expected return, r̄1g = r̄2g . Equation (11)
shows that managers strictly prefer strategy 1. Intuitively, a manager knows that he will
lose his job if his strategy fails. Strategy 1 has a smaller probability for failure, making
it more appealing to managers. Indeed, as illustrated in (11), the two strategies are
equally attractive to managers when strategy 1’s expected return is lower than strategy
2’s by R. Reputation concern makes the more negatively skewed strategy 1 appealing,
and managers are willing to forgo the alternative strategy that oﬀers an extra expected
return up to R. Following Dasgupta and Prat (2006, 2008), we call R the “reputation
premium.” Finally, managers do not have reputation concerns at t = 2; as shown in
equation (12), they simply pick the more proﬁtable strategy at t = 1, even if the choice
reveals their types at t = 2. Therefore, our analysis so far demonstrates that managers
with average reputations have a preference for strategies with negative skewness.7

2.3

Equilibrium Selection

The equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1 is natural, but other equilibria can also
exist with suﬃciently punitive oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs. Consider, for example, the case of
r̄1g + R > r̄2g . Under the equilibrium in Proposition 1, Ak0 = 1, i.e., all managers would
choose strategy 1 at t = 0. An alternative equilibrium is Ak0 = 2, with the oﬀ-equilibrium
7

In our model with a binary distribution, more negative skewness is equivalent to a lower failure
probability, which managers prefer. What happens in a general setup? To evaluate this, we must ﬁrst
formalize the concept of failure on continuous distributions. To sketch one possibility, deﬁne failure as
a return below the mean (that is, below- (above-) mean returns are more likely to have been generated
by bad (good) managers than good (bad) ones.) The use of the mean here is sensible in a ﬁnancial
context, where outperformance is described relative to an expected return. Under such a deﬁnition,
negative skewness will decrease failure probability if and only if it is associated with movement of the
mean downward along the return distribution’s CDF. This is often the case – for example, negative
skewness typically causes the mean of a distribution to fall below its median – though one can construct
distributions that violate this property; see, e.g., von Hippel, Paul T., 2005, Mean, Median, and Skew:
Correcting a Textbook Rule, Journal of Statistics Education
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belief that any defector is type-b. Note that in the equilibrium in Proposition 1, Ak0 = 1
can be supported by a less extreme oﬀ-equilibrium belief that a defector is a random
draw from the population.
Indeed, with the oﬀ-equilibrium belief that any defector is type-b, there are usually two pure strategy equilibria. One is characterized in Proposition 1. In the other
equilibrium, at t = 0, all managers adopt the alternative strategy; and at t = 1, all
managers simply adopt the strategy with the higher expected return. Investors’ decision
is as follows. They always hire the managers they meet at t = 0. When an investor
meets a manager at t = 1, the investor hires the manager if he is a new arrival or has
succeeded in his previous investment, but chooses not to hire the manager who failed in
his previous investment.
Which equilibrium is more reasonable? Our reﬁnement criterion is tâtonnement
stability, as in DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2007, 2008).8 The idea is to give each
candidate equilibrium a small perturbation to analyze the responses of the agents in the
economy through an iterative procedure. At each step of the iteration, a small group of
agents update their strategies taking the choices of other agents as given. An equilibrium
is stable if this iteration procedure brings the economy back to the original equilibrium.
More formally, let’s consider a perturbation x, 0 < x < 1, to an equilibrium: For each
strategy adopted at t = 0 in the equilibrium, a fraction x of randomly selected managers
in this strategy are moved to the alternative strategy. Then, at each step of the iteration,
(i) taking managers’ current choices as given, investors adjust the probabilities in their
updating rule (4) accordingly. (ii) taking investors’ response in (i) as given, a fraction
x of randomly selected managers in each strategy re-optimize their strategy choice.
This iteration procedure is repeated n times. Let dn denote the population size of the
managers who adopt a strategy that is diﬀerent from what they adopt in the original
equilibrium.
8

More discussions on tâtonnement stability and references can be found in Mas-Colell, Whinston,
and Green (1995, section 17.H).
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Definition 2 An equilibrium is stable if limn→∞ dn = 0 for any perturbation x ∈ (0, 1).
An equilibrium is unstable if, for any perturbation x ∈ (0, 1), limn→∞ dn ̸= 0.
One can see that in the earlier example, the alternative equilibrium Ak0 = 2 is unstable.
Let’s consider an arbitrarily small perturbation x: A random fraction x managers are
moved to strategy 1. In the ﬁrst round of iteration, investors’ decision rule implies that
a manager who fails in the ﬁrst period in either strategy loses his job at t = 1. Hence, for
the managers who have the chance to re-optimize, all of them choose strategy 1. With
each round of iteration, more and more managers move back to strategy 1. Eventually,
the population size of managers in strategy 2 converges to 0. That is, the perturbation
pushes the alternative equilibrium back to the equilibrium in Proposition 1. In fact, as
stated in the following proposition, the equilibrium in Proposition 1 is the only stable
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 For the economy deﬁned above, the stable pure strategy equilibrium is
unique and given by Proposition 1.
In the rest of the paper, we consider several extensions of the baseline model. The same
issues of multiplicity and stability arise in each extension. In the discussions below, we
will focus on the implications from the stable equilibrium.

2.4

Reputation Premium

The analysis so far captures the reputation concern of average managers. These managers can easily be replaced, because unseasoned replacement managers with average
reputations arrive regularly in the managerial market. This concern induces them to
choose strategies with negatively skewed return distributions, even if those strategies
oﬀer lower expected returns. The next question then is: What is the eﬀect of reputation
concerns on managers who are above or below average?
To answer this question, we make one modiﬁcation to the previous model by assuming
13

that a fraction of the managers have diﬀerent reputations. Speciﬁcally, at t = 0, a
fraction of managers have reputations ρ0 ̸= ρ∗ . Equivalently, there may be multiple
fractions, each with their own ρ0 . We use α to denote the total measure of those
managers. The remaining managers at t = 0, with a measure 1 − α, have reputation ρ∗ .
We assume ρ0 is high enough that investors matched with these managers will still
want to delegate,

[
]
(1 − ϕ) ρ0 (1 + r̄ig ) + (1 − ρ0 )(1 + r̄ib ) > 1.

(13)

If this assumption is violated, matched investors will simply invest in the risk-free asset.
To describe the reputation concern faced by a manager with reputation ρ0 , it will be
useful to deﬁne two thresholds,
(1 − pb1 )ρ∗
ρ ≡
,
(1 − pb1 )ρ∗ + (1 − pg1 )(1 − ρ∗ )
p b ρ∗
ρ ≡ b ∗ 2g
.
p2 ρ + p2 (1 − ρ∗ )
The ﬁrst threshold, ρ, describes the reputation level above which managers will always
be re-hired at t = 1, irrespective of any losses they might have. The second threshold,
ρ, describes the level below which managers will never be hired at t = 1, no matter how
well they perform. In other words, for superstars (ρ0 ≥ ρ) and for lost causes (ρ0 <
ρ), reputation concerns don’t matter.9 For all other managers, ρ0 ∈ [ρ, ρ], reputation
concerns enter their decision, as Proposition 3 below describes.
The behavior of the managers with reputation ρ∗ remains the same as in the previous section.10 Our focus now is to analyze the strategy choices of the managers with
reputation ρ0 . As noted earlier, strategy 1 oﬀers relatively small positive returns most
of the time but occasionally leads to dramatic losses. In contrast, strategy 2 is like a bet
on a small probability event: suﬀering small losses r2− most of the time but obtaining
9
Note that as the time horizon in the model increases, the reputation thresholds for superstars and
lost-causes approach, respectively, 1 and 0. Said diﬀerently, for any initial reputation ρ ̸= 1, there exists
some ﬁnite number of failures t that will bring the posterior reputation below ρ∗ .
10
To see this, note that these managers face exactly the same payoﬀs as in the previous section. For
more details, see the proof of Proposition 3.
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a large gain r2+ occasionally. It is natural (though not mandatory) that large ﬁnancial
gains lead to large reputational gains, and vice versa.11 The association across strategies
between ﬁnancial and reputational outcomes will hold whenever we have
pg2
pg1
> b,
pb2
p1

and

1 − pb1
1 − pb2
.
g >
1 − p1
1 − pg2

(14)

The ﬁrst relation ensures that a manager gains more reputation after a big return in
strategy 2 than after a small proﬁt in strategy 1, and the second ensures that a manager
suﬀers a larger reputation loss after a crash in strategy 1 than after a small loss in
strategy 2. At the end of this section, we will revisit other cases when (14) does not
hold. The following proposition summarizes the eﬀect of reputation concerns on strategy
choices at t = 0.
Proposition 3 These managers’ reputation premium at t = 0 is given by
case 1:

R = −(1 − pg1 )(1 + max{r̄1g , r̄2g })

if ρ0 ∈ [ρh , ρ),

(15)

case 2:

R = (pg1 − pg2 )(1 + max{r̄1g , r̄2g })

if ρ0 ∈ [ρl , ρh ),

(16)

case 3:

R = −pg2 (1 + max{r̄1g , r̄2g })

if ρ0 ∈ [ρ, ρl ),

(17)

where ρh and ρl are given by
(1 − pb2 )ρ∗
,
(1 − pb2 )ρ∗ + (1 − pg2 )(1 − ρ∗ )
pb ρ∗
≡ b ∗ 1g
.
p1 ρ + p1 (1 − ρ∗ )

ρh ≡

(18)

ρl

(19)

This proposition shows that the eﬀect of reputation concern varies substantially with
the manager’s initial reputation level. In case 1, the manager’s reputation is well above
average, ρ0 ∈ [ρh , ρ). Unless his fund has a big crash, i.e., r1− , the manager faces no risk
11
To see where they do not correspond, consider a strategy where good and bad managers have nearly
identical probabilities of success. Posterior reputations of managers in such a strategy will only move
a small amount, no matter what ﬁnancial outcomes obtain. Nevertheless, within a strategy, the ratio
of up- and down-move sizes must always be consistent the martingale property of reputation. In other
words, if a nickel-picking strategy has small reputational losses despite large ﬁnancial losses, then it
must have minuscule reputational gains from its moderate ﬁnancial gains.
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of losing his job at t = 1. As a result, the manager is reluctant to be exposed to the
crash risk in strategy 1. The manager may choose not to invest in strategy 1 even if it
is more proﬁtable, i.e., the reputation premium is negative.
In case 2, ρ0 ∈ [ρl , ρh ), the manager’s reputation is around the average level ρ∗ (note
that ρ∗ ∈ [ρl , ρh )). Hence, as in the previous section, this manager faces competition
from average managers. With his job at risk, this manager ﬁnds strategy 1 appealing.
He prefers to invest in strategy 1 even if it oﬀers a lower return, as summarized by the
reputation premium in (16).
In case 3, the manager’s reputation is way below average. He will lose his job at
t = 1, unless he can signiﬁcantly improve his reputation. A success in the nickel-picking
strategy 1 is not enough since it can only lead to a small increase in the manager’s
reputation. On the other hand, strategy 2 is like “swinging for the fences”: a success
is enough to help the manager to keep his job. Hence, the manager has a preference
against strategy 1. As shown in (17), the reputation premium is negative.
In summary, unless their reputations are extremely high or extremely low, (i.e., ρ0 ≥
ρ or ρ0 < ρ), managers adjust their strategy choices according to reputation concerns.
The reputation premium is non-monotonic in the manager’s reputation level. Wellestablished managers (case 1) ﬁnd the nickel-picking strategy 1 unappealing because of
its “crash risk.” Average managers (case 2) ﬁnd strategy 1 appealing because it helps
them to retain their jobs. Finally, managers with below average reputations (case 3)
prefer to swing for the fences since this is the only way for them to have a chance to
keep their jobs.
Removing (14) only leads to small changes to the implications in Proposition 3. To
see this, recall that (14) imposed two conditions: that a manager gains more reputation
after a big return in strategy 2 than after a small proﬁt in strategy 1, and that a
manager suﬀers a larger reputation loss after a crash in strategy 1 than after a small
loss in strategy 2. The violation of the ﬁrst condition leads to the disappearance of case
3 and the expansion of case 1, while the violation of the second condition leads to the
16

disappearance of case 1 and the expansion of case 3.

2.5

Popularity of Negatively Skewed Strategies

Case 2 of Proposition 3 shows that negatively skewed strategies are appealing to managers with average reputations. It is perhaps reasonable to expect most managers fall
into this category.12 There are plenty of anecdotes suggesting the popularity of nickelpicking strategies and the unappealing nature of betting on a small probability event.
For example, despite repeated warnings of the housing bubble before 2007, few market
participants found it appealing to bet on its collapse. Betting on the collapse is the opposite of a nickel-picking strategy, and it is a daunting task for average managers. Suppose
someone was convinced that the subprime crisis was emerging in 2005. He could buy
credit default swaps (CDS) on assets backed by subprime mortgages. Then he would
expect to incur repeated losses (i.e., pay the premium for the CDS) for a long period
of time before the housing bubble bursts. This strategy is therefore more attractive to
managers with fewer reputation concerns, e.g., those betting with personal wealth.13 In
the few cases in which hedge fund managers bet against the housing market, there are
plenty of detailed stories about them enduring the pressure of capital withdrawal from
their investors after initial losses.14
While these anecdotes are eye-catching, they might reﬂect unusual behavior during
rare events. To analyze the systematic behavior of fund managers over time, we collect
the monthly returns (January 1994 to April 2008) of the constituent indices of the
Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index and calculate the skewness of individual index
returns. There are ten style-based constituent indices, and member funds are assigned
to a particular style based on self-reported information. The results are shown in Table
1.
12

For example, Edwards (1999) ﬁnds that the average life span of a hedge fund is 40 months. Hence,
most managers perhaps have similar reputations and are highly replaceable.
13
See, e.g., “Tiger’s Julian Robertson roars again,” CNNMoney.com, January 29, 2008; “In Beverly
Hills, A Meltdown Mogul Is Living Large,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008.
14
See, e.g., The Big Short by Michael Lewis, 2011.
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The evidence suggests that nickel-picking strategies are indeed very popular among
hedge fund managers: four out of the ten style indices, representing more than 40%
of the assets of Hedge Fund Index member funds, are negatively skewed at the 5%
level. It is particularly interesting to note that the “multi-strategy” index is negatively
skewed, suggesting that when a fund does not restrict its strategy choice, managers tend
to select nickel-picking strategies. In contrast, only one index, “Dedicated short bias,”
representing only 0.6% of hedge fund assets, is signiﬁcantly positively skewed.15
Note that because these calculations are performed using indices rather than individual fund returns, there is likely a bias against ﬁnding signiﬁcance: If strategy returns
were independent across the individual component funds, then by the law of large numbers, the aggregate of these returns would display little or no skewness. This suggests
that returns of hedge funds in the same strategy are correlated and that the skewness
in individual funds’ return is likely to be even stronger than presented in the table.

2.6

Slow-Moving Capital

Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) document that before the end of 2004, convertible bond arbitrage funds were very popular and collectively managed around $40 billion
of assets. After some big losses, however, this strategy quickly went out of fashion in
2005, and the total assets under management in the sector fell by half within several
months. Interestingly, the authors also note that the typical convertible bond arbitrage
strategy appeared to be more proﬁtable in 2005, and this seemingly proﬁtable opportunity appeared to last well into 2006 (the end of their sample). This extensive delay for
capital to move back is puzzling, and the authors dub the phenomenon “slow-moving
capital.”
We now illustrate that slow-moving capital arises naturally due to reputation con15

The skewness of certain trading strategies has been noticed in the literature. For example, Mitchell
and Pulvino (2001) ﬁnd that returns to merger arbitrage are similar to those from selling put options,
and Duarte, Longstaﬀ, and Yu (2007) show that some ﬁxed-income arbitrage strategies can produce
positively skewed returns.
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cerns. Our interpretation has two ingredients. The ﬁrst one is more straightforward.
A manager’s reputation suﬀers more from a failure if his strategy is more like “nickelpicking,” i.e., the strategy return is more negatively skewed. When an unusually large
number of managers in a nickel-picking strategy suﬀer losses, the big drop in reputation
leads to capital withdrawal, and there are not enough new managers to replace them.
Hence there is less capital exploiting the strategy temporarily.
The second ingredient is the slow recovery process of the managers’ reputations.
A natural consequence of negative skewness in the return distribution is that once a
manager suﬀers from a reputation shock, it takes longer for him to rebuild his reputation
back to his original level. Intuitively, if a manager adopts a nickel-picking strategy, his
reputation tends to go up gradually in small steps, but occasionally drops sharply in a
big step. By the law of iterated expectations, a manager’s reputation is a martingale.
If a martingale process goes up more often than down, the size of up-moves has to
be smaller than the size of down-moves. Therefore, after a failure in a nickel-picking
strategy, it takes a long time for the manager’s reputation to recover.
To illustrate the above intuition, we take the model in Section 2.2, and pick the
parameters so that the nickel-picking strategy 1 is chosen in equilibrium at t = 0, e.g.,
rg1 = rg2 . Suppose that all managers suﬀer losses in their strategy at t = 1,16 and that
µ < 1, so that new managers are not enough to replace all failed managers. What
happens to the aggregate size of capital managed by all managers?
To answer this, we ﬁrst note, from (4), that all else being equal, a manager’s reputation suﬀers more from a failure if the strategy is more like nickel picking, i.e., if
pg1 is larger. When the reputation loss is suﬃciently large, investors would withdraw
their capital and try to replace their managers if they can. The following proposition
characterizes the population size of the managers who can keep their investors.
16

The probability of this event is inﬁnitesimal, if one literally takes the number of managers as inﬁnity.
For any ﬁnite number of managers, however, this event has a strictly positive probability. We can view
the following Proposition 4 as the limit case when the number of managers is large. The basic intuition
discussed in this section does not depend on the number of managers.
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Proposition 4 After all managers suﬀer a loss in strategy 1 at t = 1, the population
size of the managers hired by investors is given by
{
1 if pg1 ≤ p∗ ,
µ if pg1 > p∗ ,
where
p∗ ≡
and ρm satisﬁes

1 + ρm (1 − ρ∗ )pb1
,
1 + ρm (1 − ρ∗ )

]
[
(1 − ϕ) ρm (1 + r̄1g ) + (1 − ρm )(1 + r̄1b ) = 1.

(20)

(21)

After the losses, managers’ reputation is below their initial level ρ∗ . Hence, an investor
prefers to hire a replacement manager, if she can ﬁnd one. Therefore, µ investors can
replace their managers with new ones. What happens to the rest of the investors?
Since they cannot ﬁnd new managers, they need to decide whether to keep their current
managers, or withdraw and invest on their own. In the case where the strategy return
is not suﬃciently negatively skewed (pg1 ≤ p∗ ), the managers’ reputation loss is not
large enough and investors still prefer to keep them. Hence, the total population size
of managers at t = 1 is 1. That is, µ old managers lose their jobs and are replaced by
new ones, and 1 − µ old managers keep their jobs despite their poor performances. In
the other case where the strategy return is suﬃciently negatively skewed (pg1 > p∗ ), the
reputation loss is so large that investors would rather invest on their own. Hence, all
old managers lose their jobs and the total population size of managers at t = 1 drops
to µ. In summary, this proposition illustrates that after a widespread poor performance
in a strategy, the population size of managers is reduced only if the strategy return is
suﬃciently negatively skewed.
More importantly, after the reputation shock, it takes a long time for the managers
to rebuild their reputation back to their original level. Intuitively, a subtle but natural
consequence of negative skewness in return distribution is that managers’ reputation
tends to go up gradually in small steps, but occasionally drops sharply in a big step. By
the law of iterated expectations, a manager’s reputation is a martingale. If a martingale
20

process goes up more often than down, the size of up-moves has to be smaller than the
size of down-moves. Therefore, after a failure in a nickel-picking strategy, it takes a long
time for the manager’s reputation to recover. This point becomes clear in the following
thought experiment: Suppose a manager has a failure in one strategy. How quickly can
his reputation recover back to the original level? The answer is given by the following
proposition.
Proposition 5 Deﬁne N as the smallest positive integer that satisﬁes
( )N
1 − pgi pgi
≥ 1.
1 − pbi pbi
Then, following a failure in strategy i, it takes N consecutive successes in strategy i for
his reputation to recover back to his original level. Moreover, N weakly increases in pgi
and pbi .
Suppose pg1 = 0.7 and pb1 = 0.6, i.e., a type g manager’s success probability is 70% and
a type b manager’s is 60%. This implies N = 2; that is, after a failure in this strategy,
it takes two consecutive successes for a manager to rebuild his reputation back to its
original level. If we increase pg1 to 0.95 (pg1 = 0.95 and pb1 = 0.6), for example, N increases
to 5; i.e., it takes ﬁve consecutive successes for a manager’s reputation to recover. If we
further increase pb1 to 0.9, (pg1 = 0.95 and pb1 = 0.9), N = 13, i.e., it takes 13 consecutive
successes for a manager’s reputation to recover back to his original level. That is, when
the strategy return is more negatively skewed, it takes longer for a manager to rebuild
his reputation after a failure.
The above analysis abstracts away from fund managers’ eﬀect on market prices.
However, it is straightforward to introduce a price eﬀect to endogenize strategy returns.
For example, in practice, when a large volume of hedge fund capital ﬂows into or out of a
given strategy, it is likely to put pressure on the underlying asset prices.17 Hence, when
many hedge funds are forced to reduce their investments due to capital withdrawal from
17

Even in the most liquid markets, such as the U.S. treasury market, relatively small supply shocks
can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on asset prices, as documented in Lou, Yan and Zhang (2013).
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their clients, the strategy would become even more proﬁtable. While their reputation
slowly recovers, fund managers may have a hard time raising capital to exploit the
opportunity, and hence capital appears to be slow moving. Another dimension on which
to generalize our model is to extend it to include more periods. With more periods
left, a manager’s decision problem is more complex. However, the basic intuition is
still the same as in our two-period model. At each date, a manager faces the tradeoﬀ
between the management fee for the current period and the fees in the future. Through
backward induction, we can calculate the manager’s continuation value if he adopts
a certain strategy. The manager’s preference for each strategy is determined by the
expected fee from the current period, which is linked to the strategy’s expected return,
and his continuation value, which is determined by his chance of keeping his job to earn
management fees in the future. Hence, reputation concerns still aﬀect managers’ choices
in a similar way as captured in our current model.

3

Discussions

The previous analysis takes the compensation contract as given. A natural question
is whether investors and managers can design a diﬀerent contract to help mitigate the
ineﬃciency (i.e., investing in a less proﬁtable strategy). In the following, we discuss
the eﬀects of three contracting mechanisms: lockups, high-powered incentives, and precommitment. We ﬁnd that lockups improve eﬃciency for some but not all parameter
values, while high-powered incentives and pre-commitment are likely to be of limited
eﬀectiveness.

3.1

Lockup

Suppose investors agree to lock up their capital with a manager for a certain period,
thereby ensuring that the manager’s career is safe during the lockup period. The manager could therefore have several chances to try the positively skewed strategy before
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investors could withdraw capital. This is essentially equivalent to making the strategy
less like a bet on a small probability event. As a result, having a lockup can decrease the
reputation premium, making managers more willing to take strategy 2 when it oﬀers a
higher expected return.
By alleviating the career concern, lockups unambiguously improve managers’ welfare.
However, the same is not always true for the investors, who face a tradeoﬀ between the
option of ﬁring their manager and the beneﬁt of less-distorted investment decisions
from the lockup provision. Intuitively, one can see that the option value is highest
for investors whose manager has a low reputation. In fact, investors prefer to not to
have the lockup provision when their manager’s reputation ρ is low, or when the return
diﬀerential between strategies is small. Note that these are precisely the cases when
reputation concerns are likely to distort investments. Lastly, in practice, the lockup
period is usually around one year; its eﬀect is hence limited.18

3.2

High-powered incentives

In the simple setup analyzed earlier, one can design a contract to induce a separating
equilibrium where only type g managers ﬁnd it attractive to be a money manager, while
type b managers prefer to leave the industry and choose a diﬀerent career. The simplest
such contract is to oﬀer a very high reward for success and to combine it with a large
penalty for failure. For instance, since a type g manager has a higher chance of succeeding
than a type b one, we can choose the sizes of the reward and penalty such that only
type-g managers ﬁnd the contract acceptable. This implies that only the g-type chooses
to be a manager, and the b-type leaves the industry. Of course, such a contract is likely
to be impractical when managers have limited liability and are risk averse.
18

One of the reasons for short lockups is oﬀered by Stein (2005): managers may have the incentive
to signal their ability by voluntarily choosing a contract with a short or no lockup.
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3.3

Pre-commitment

In our model, we assume that an investor can ﬁnd out her manager’s strategy ex post.
Hence, the investor can eliminate the distortion induced by reputation concerns by committing to ﬁre her manager who chooses the low return strategy, regardless of the outcome ex post. In essence, this mechanism alleviates the problem of reputation concerns
by letting investors dictate their managers’ strategy.
There are three practical challenges to the implementation of such a mechanism.
First of all, this mechanism relies heavily on the credibility of the commitment. Suppose
a manager implements the lower return strategy and succeeds. Then, the investor will
be tempted to renege on her threat to ﬁre the manager, since any replacement manager
would have a strictly lower reputation. Hence, this mechanism is not eﬀective without a
credible commitment. Second, the commitment is unlikely to be credible if the investor
faces competition: other investors will be more than happy to hire this manager. Third,
even if investors can credibly commit, this mechanism is likely to be less than perfect
if the commitment technology is costly, or if it is costly for investors to verify their
manager’s strategy reliably.

4

Conclusions

We have analyzed a stylized dynamic equilibrium model of strategy choices by fund
managers. It shows that reputation concerns induce a preference over the skewness
of strategy returns. The preference is non-monotonic in the manager’s reputation level:
While managers with average reputations prefer strategies with negatively skewed return
distributions, those with high or low reputations prefer the opposite. To the extent that
most managers have average reputations, our model oﬀers a simple explanation for why
many popular hedge fund strategies are like picking up nickels in front of a steamroller
(i.e., have negatively skewed return distributions).
Our model also explains why only negatively skewed strategies tend to suﬀer from
24

slow-moving capital. A subtle but natural consequence of nickel-picking strategies is
that after poor performance, managers’ reputations recover slowly, leading to the phenomenon that capital sometimes appears to be slow moving, leaving attractive opportunities unexploited for an extended period of time.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Given the labor market structure and (5), hiring any matched manager with ρ ≥ ρ∗ is
strictly better than investing in the risk-free asset. Since there are plenty of new arrivals,
investors will never meet with managers with ρ < ρ∗ (those who failed in the previous
period). Hence, investors’ decision rule is given by (10).19 At t = 1, each manager’s
optimal choice follows directly from his objective function (8), so we have Ak1 = i iﬀ
r̄ik > r̄jk . At t = 0, when manager types pool, following (10), we have Ek [D1 ] = pki
on-equilibrium where Ak0 = i. There are two cases:
Case 1: r̄1g + R > r̄2g . By inspection of (7), a type-k manager prefers not to defect
from Ak0 = 1 under an oﬀ-equilibrium belief that a defector is a random draw from the
population; such a belief implies Ek [D1 |defect] = pk2 .
Case 2: r̄1g + R ≤ r̄2g . Note that under the oﬀ-equilibrium belief that a defector
is a random draw from the population (which implies Ek [D1 |defect] = pk1 ), a type-g
manager will not defect from strategy 2, but a type-b manager will (because r̄1b = r̄2b ).
To prevent defection from type-b managers requires (D1 |defect) = 0, which follows from
an oﬀ-equilibrium belief that a defector is type-b. This belief is reasonable in the sense of
Cho and Kreps (1987), because type-b managers would in fact defect under some more
tolerant oﬀ-equilibrium belief.
Proof of Proposition 2
Since condition (9) has ruled out separating equilibria, there are at most two pure
strategy equilibria in this economy. In the ﬁrst equilibrium, denoted as E1 , Ak0 = 1, for
k = g, b. In the second equilibrium E2 , Ak0 = 2. In both candidate equilibria, by the
argument in the proof of Proposition 1, Ak1 is given by (8), and Dt (ρ) by (10), with the
Strictly speaking, investors will never meet managers with certain reputation levels (e.g., below ρ∗ ).
Hence, decision rules that only diﬀer on that region are observationally equivalent on the equilibrium
path. We treat them as the same decision rule in our discussion.
19
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oﬀ-equilibrium belief that defectors are of type-b. We use Ui , for i = 1, 2, to denote
type-g managers’ expected utility in candidate equilibrium i:
U1 ≡ Eg [ϕ(1 + r1 ) + D1 V |E1 ],

(22)

U2 ≡ Eg [ϕ(1 + r2 ) + D1 V |E2 )],

(23)

where
V ≡ ϕ (1 + max{r̄1g , r̄2g }) .
In the following we show that E1 is stable if U1 > U2 , and E2 is stable if U1 ≤ U2 .
Let’s consider the candidate equilibrium E1 . Deﬁne ρi,n , for i = 1, 2, as the fraction
of the managers in strategy i, at iteration n (before managers re-optimize), who are type
g. After a perturbation x, there are 1 − x managers in strategy 1 and x managers in
strategy 2 and ρ1,1 = ρ2,1 = ρ∗ . Hence at the ﬁrst iteration, given (4) and (10), ρ|ri and
Ek [D1 ] are the same as they are in Ei . Therefore, type-g managers who can re-optimize
at n = 1 choose:

{

strategy 1 if U1 > U2 ,
strategy 2 if U1 ≤ U2 .

(24)

Note that U1 > U2 is equivalent to r̄1g +R > r̄2g ; and U1 ≤ U2 is equivalent to r̄1g +R ≤ r̄2g .
Suppose U1 > U2 . In the following, we show that E1 is stable by showing that the
population size of managers in strategy 2 goes to 0 when n goes to ∞.
Suppose in the ﬁrst n iterations, movable type-g managers (those who had the chance
to re-optimize) had all chosen strategy 1. Then at iteration n+1, they also adopt strategy
1: If movable type-b managers had also chosen strategy 1 in the previous n iterations,
then ρn+1,1 = ρn+1,2 = ρ∗ . If however for any n′ ≤ n, type-b managers did not choose
strategy 1, then ρn+1,1 > ρ∗ > ρn+1,2 . Hence, if type-g managers choose strategy 1 at
n = 1, then they choose strategy 1 at any n > 1, and there are ρ∗ x(1 − x)n−1 type-g
managers in strategy 2 at iteration n.
We use mn to denote the population size of type-b managers in strategy 2 at iteration
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n. From (4) and (10), there exists ρ̂ such that for any ρ < ρ̂, Ek [D1 ] = 0. If for all n,
mn ≤

ρ∗ (1 − ρ̂)x(1 − x)n−1
,
ρ̂

(25)

then limn→∞ mn = 0. Otherwise, suppose there exists n′ such that (25) is violated.
Then
ρ2,n′ < ρ̂,
so given (9), movable type-b managers choose strategy 1 at iteration n′ . Lastly, note
that the fraction of managers in strategy 2 who are type-g can never increase, because
even if a fraction x of the type-b managers leave, a fraction x of the type-g managers
are also leaving. So if ρ2,n < ρ̂, type-b managers leave at every subsequent iteration, so
the number of type-b managers in strategy 2 also goes to zero as n goes to inﬁnity.
In summary, the above shows that E1 is stable, and also implies that E2 is unstable.
By similar arguments, if U1 ≤ U2 , E1 is unstable and E2 is stable. Note that in all cases,
all managers end up in the equilibrium where type-g managers have the higher expected
utility.
Proof of Proposition 3
There are two types of managers in this economy, those with reputation ρ∗ and those
with reputation ρ0 . The group with ρ0 has measure α; as long as α < 1, their choices
do not aﬀect the payoﬀs to the ρ∗ managers. To see why, ﬁrst note that under (13), all
managers are hired at t = 0. Second, note that at t = 1, investors’ decision rule, and
thus managers’ continuation values, remains
{
1 if ρ ≥ ρ∗ ,
D1 (ρ) =
0 if ρ < ρ∗ ,

(26)

as in proposition 1. The threshold does not move up, because no matter how well the ρ0
managers perform, the measure of managers from t = 0 with reputations greater than
or equal to ρ∗ at t = 1 is less than 1. The threshold does not move down, because there
are enough new arrivals µ with reputation ρ∗ , so an investor would never need to hire a
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manager with ρ < ρ∗ .
Similarly, regardless of the choice of the ρ∗ managers, ρ0 managers face the same
payoﬀs: they keep their job as long as their reputation at t = 1 is not lower than ρ∗ .
That is, the strategy choices of one group are not aﬀected by the other group’s choices.
Therefore, we can analyze each group separately.
The choice of the ρ∗ group is as in Proposition 1. In the following, we will focus on the
choice by the ρ0 group. By the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2, the stable
equilibrium is the one in which type-g managers’ expected utility is maximized across
the two potential equilibria. Therefore, to determine the stable equilibrium, we just
need to compare type-g managers’ expected utility across the two potential equilibria.
Hence, by the logic in the proof of Proposition 2, the stable equilibrium is the one with
Ag0 = Ab0 = 1, iﬀ r̄1g + R > r̄2g with
(
)
R = Eg [D1 |Ag0 = Ab0 = 1] − Eg [D1 |Ag0 = Ab0 = 2] (1 + max{r̄1g , r̄2g }) .

(27)

Similarly the stable equilibrium is the one with Ag0 = Ab0 = 2, iﬀ r̄1g + R ≤ r̄2g . After some
algebra, we can show that the reputation premium R in (27) is equivalent to (15)–(17).
Proof of Proposition 4
Note that ρm is the reputation level such that an investor is indiﬀerent between delegating
to a manager who chooses strategy 1, and investing in the risk free asset. Investors’
decision rule at t = 1 is

{
D1 =

1 if ρ1 ≥ ρm ,
0 otherwise,

(28)

where ρm is given by (21). Following the proof of Proposition 3, in the stable equilibrium,
at t = 0, all managers choose strategy 1.
When pg1 = p∗ , after a down-move, the manager’s posterior reputation equals exactly
ρm . From Bayes’ rule, all else equal, increasing pg1 decreases ρ1 after a failure. When
pg1 > p∗ , seasoned managers’ reputations are less than ρm at t = 1, and investors refuse
to delegate to them following D1 above. Therefore, only the replacement managers µ
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can attract money at t = 1. Similarly, when pg1 ≤ p∗ , seasoned managers’ reputations
are greater than or equal to ρm at t = 1, so investors are willing to delegate to them.
Therefore, investors ﬁrst delegate to a more reputable replacement manager if they can
ﬁnd one, and otherwise delegate to a seasoned manager.
Proof of Proposition 5
It follows from Bayes’ rule that (1 − pgi )(pgi )k ≥ (1 − pbi )(pbi )k is a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for ρt+k+1 ≥ ρt after one failure and k successes, with equality in one associated
with equality in the other. Rearranging gives the corollary. To see that N is increasing
in pg1 , deﬁne m as the solution to
1 − pgi
1 − pbi

(

pgi
pbi

)m
= 1.

Then n is the smallest integer that is larger than m. Solving for m, we obtain
( b)
1−p
Log 1−pgi
( g i) .
m=
p
Log pib

(29)

i

Diﬀerentiating with respect to

pgi ,

after some algebra, we obtain

∂m
=
∂pgi
where

(
X = pg Log

So, the sign of

∂m
∂pgi

X
(1 −

pgi
pbi

pgi )pgi Log

( g )2 ,
pi
pbi

)

(
− (1 −

pgi )Log

1 − pbi
1 − pgi

)
.

is the same as the sign of X. Note that
1 − pgi
pgi
∂X
=
− b < 0.
∂pbi
1 − pbi
pi

That is, X decreases in pbi . So, X’s inﬁmum is achieved at pbi ’s supremum (pbi = pgi ),
which is X = 0. This implies that X > 0 for pbi < pgi . Therefore, m strictly increases in
pgi , and hence N weakly increases in pgi . Similarly, we can prove that N weakly increases
in pbi .
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Table 1: The Skewness of Hedge Fund Indices
Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index
Sector Weight Skewness
Convertible Arbitrage
1.90%
−1.59∗
(0.33)
Fixed Income Arb.
4.70%
−3.35∗
(0.75)
Multi-Strategy
10.40%
−1.06∗
(0.30)
Event Driven
24.40%
−3.27∗
(1.42)
Emerging Markets
8.50%
−0.79
(0.72)
Global Macro
13.80%
0.05
(0.51)
Managed Futures
4.00%
0.02
(0.18)
Long/Short Equity
26.40%
0.19
(0.62)
Equity Market Neutral
5.30%
0.34
(0.20)
Dedicated Short Bias
0.60%
0.83∗
(0.38)

Table 1: Data consist of the monthly returns of the constituent indices of the Credit
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund index, beginning with the inception of the index in January 1994 until April 2008. The index consists of approximately nine hundred member
funds, each with a minimum of $50 million in assets under management and at least a
one-year track record, who voluntarily report monthly return information. There are ten
style-based constituent indices; member funds are assigned to a particular style based on
self-reported information. Style index returns are an asset-weighted combination of individual fund returns. Because some constituent indices did not report returns until April
of the ﬁrst year, we drop the ﬁrst three months of data for our calculations. This leaves
169 monthly return observations. The construction methodology for the index rules
out the backﬁll bias and minimizes survivorship bias (see Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge
Fund Index Rules, available at http://www.hedgeindex.com). Numbers in parentheses
are bootstrap standard errors, calculated with 10,000 draws. Statistical signiﬁcance at
the 5% level is indicated by *.
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